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Abstract. This work explores the behavioural dimension of compliance to infor-
mation security standards. We review past literature, building on different models of 
human behaviour, based on relevant theories like deterrence theory and the theory of 
planned behaviour. We conduct a survey of IT professionals, managers and employ-
ees of selected banks from Nigeria as part of a sector case study focussed in this re-
gion. Our findings suggest that security by compliance as a campaign to secure in-
formation assets in the Nigerian financial institution is a farfetched approach. In addi-
tion to standards, banking regulators should promote holistic change of security cul-
ture across the sector.  Based on an established model of Information Security Gov-
ernance Framework, we propose how information security may be embedded into 
organisation security culture in that context. 
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Security culture 
1 Introduction 
Information security management policies are often difficult to be successfully im-
plemented because significant issues of diffused liability and incentives are not ap-
propriately distributed. Information systems exploitation is not always a consequence 
of technical or policy failure, but often due to the lack of balanced incentives between 
the designers and users of such systems [1]. Despite managements’ efforts to protect 
organization data, problems of identity theft, database breaches and stolen passwords 
continue to be major challenges faced by corporate organizations and government 
agencies [2]. Today, one of the biggest challenges faced by organisations is system 
misuse by insiders, whose actions are deeply rooted on non-compliance to regulatory 
standards. It has been established that the weakest link in information security defence 
is the human element [3, 4], implying that of the most considerable threats comes 
from insiders. Lack of compliance by employees to information security policies is 
claimed to be responsible for more than half of information systems security breaches 
[5]. It is often difficult for organisations to balance the psychological, incentive and 
communication need of employees due to the complex nature of human behaviour. If 
all end-users are rational, cyber security will be a straight game between defenders 
and attackers of information assets. However, insider actions that are not necessarily 
malicious but inconsistent with policy and difficult to explain (e.g. clicking on links in 
phishing emails) place attackers at significant advantage against system defenders and 
wider risk exposure to organisation security. 
The ISO/IEC27001 is an international standard for best practices in Information 
Security Management Systems (ISMS), which outline comprehensive requirements 
for safeguarding organisations information assets. It defines baseline requirements 
and controls for the assessment of ISMS, under the principle of confidentiality, integ-
rity and availability [6]. Standards guidelines did not necessarily address how to cap-
ture the thought process of system adversaries; there seem to be more concerted effort 
on the implementation of physical, policy and technical measures to mitigate anticipa-
tory threats. Some of the previous research on this subject [7] identified that the size 
and need of organisations vary when it comes to protecting IT infrastructure, and that 
different organisations require different security treatments. Hence, the one-cap-fits-
all approach of Standards undermine the effectiveness of security by compliance. 
1.1 ‘Compliant security’ 
It is quite possible to meet compliance requirements and still be insecure within the 
context of information security. Organisations can easily implement all of the baseline 
security requirements in Standards to become compliant, yet not secure. For instance, 
compliance requirement of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) suggests that data should be encrypted at FIPS 140 level. If a full disk encryp-
tion is carried out but the encryption key is stored on the same disk, compliance re-
quirements may have been addressed while still insecure. A secure and compliant 
approach would be full disk encryption and independent key management.  
Business executives often focus on the cost of implementing compliance programs 
and once achieved, they operate under the assumption that compliance equates securi-
ty. In practice, control baseline may be enough for business executives and regulators, 
but it is insufficient in providing holistic security protection. Security auditors and 
management may combine efforts to develop useable security policies but employee 
compliance to policies cannot be guaranteed. In a publicly reported 2014 cyber heist 
[9, 10], a Nigerian bank lost £23.5m through an insider operating with rogue third 
party contractors. Incidentally, the bank has been certified ISO27001 compliant, in 
line with the regulatory requirement of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The CBN is 
Nigerian apex bank responsible monitoring, reforming and regulating the activities of 
banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria [8]. This goes to show that organisa-
tions can implement the toughest security policies, but performance is largely down to 
users. Cyber criminals would rather target authorized users who already sits within an 
organisation, than having a crack at multiple layers of outside facing firewalls. 
While compliance processes are aimed at hardening organisations security defence, 
sometimes, how standards are interpreted can actually contribute to a porous security 
postures. If employees consider guidelines difficult to interpret or irrelevant to a busi-
ness unit, it can easily give ground to non-compliance by way of accidental or delib-
erate introduction of threats to the environment [11]. Cases of security breaches due 
to negligence, intent and lack of understanding of policy requirements continue to 
make rounds despite the certification status attained by other Nigerian banks. Some 
employees continue to ignore security guidelines, while some find the extra steps 
introduced to complete tasks as interfering with job productivity. It has been suggest-
ed that users often fail to adhere to policy requirements because it is burdensome and 
there is no rational justification to comply from users’ economic perspective; espe-
cially if the benefit is largely speculative, or the consequence is of little or no harm to 
the users [12]. There is a thin line between security and productivity [13], some em-
ployees often felt compelled to opt for productivity at the expense of security and 
compliance, when additional steps are required to complete a task. In a survey of 
more than 500 professionals, over 60% admitted to using personal accounts to store 
and disseminate sensitive organisation data [14], because they felt that consumer op-
tions are more intuitive and easier to use than approved technology that sits within 
policy guidelines. Policy is an important aspect of security but it is only as effective 
as the technology and people backing it. 
In this paper we explore the behavioural dimension of compliance to information 
security. Building on different models of human behavior, including deterrence theory 
and the theory of planned behavior (section 2), we conduct a survey of IT profession-
als, managers and employees of selected banks from Nigeria as part of a sector case 
study focussed on the region (section 3). In light of our results and discussion (sec-
tions 4 and 5) and based on an established model of Information Security Governance 
Framework (section 5), we propose how information security may be embedded into 
organisation security culture in that context (section 6). 
2 Relevant Work  
Security standards and written policies assume perfect rationale of users of infor-
mation assets. Humans are not programmable machines, and often behave in manners 
that are completely out of the norm [15]. There are many studies on why it is chal-
lenging to enforce compliance in humans. Starting with technical security, [16, and 
17] pointed out why it is difficult to audit human behaviour in the same way technical 
auditing tools work. Irrational behaviour borders on frustration, anger or despair pro-
pelled by lack of job satisfaction, vendetta, financial and personal problems [18]. 
However, when organisations conduct security audits, it is the technical side that is 
often mostly addressed. Log files may capture and report unauthorized insider activi-
ties but the behaviour and motive is not necessarily captured. Therefore technical 
security audits verify consequences of behaviour but not the actual behaviour itself.  
Organisations often apply deterrence measures to enforce policy compliance but 
studies [19, 20] based on deterrent theory suggested that employees’ motivation dif-
fers across organisations, therefore, deterrent measures that work with one organisa-
tion may not necessarily fit into another. Deterrence implies rational behavior and 
even standards like ISO/IEC27001, COBIT and NIST draw on the principle of Gen-
eral Deterrence Theory [18], where rational users of information assets are expected 
to fit within a certain frame of reference. Unfortunately; that is not always the case. 
Deterrent actions, through reward or punishment has been shown to fail in organisa-
tions. Again, contrary to perfect rational assumption, punishing employees for acci-
dental misuse or negligence may yield negative consequences. Besides, it is impracti-
cal, time consuming and expensive to monitor employees continuously in order to 
enforce or deter certain behaviours. Without a grounded insight into the understand-
ing of employees’ motivation, deterrent measures as a means to address insider threat 
may not necessarily work. 
Other works that explored the theory of planned behaviour [21, 22] suggested that 
training and awareness are the most significant factors that influence human behav-
iour and attitude towards information security. It was argued that attitude, perceived 
expectation and subjective norm are the incentive components of behavioural inten-
tion. Hence, change in employee attitude that is in line with corporate expectations 
can be addressed with information security awareness campaigns. Although, some 
organisations put concerted effort into training with the hope of addressing security 
awareness gaps, but it is clear that training is not sufficient to ensure compliance and 
training is not the same as security culture [4]. What then can be done to ensure com-
pliant behaviour? Can change be unforced? How can compliance be integrated into 
organisation security culture? This is the open space that our work tries to address in 
our specific context. 
3 Research Method 
Survey methodology can be used to study employees’ opinion, attitude and behav-
ioural patterns within the context of information security [23]. We carried out a sur-
vey of four banks in Nigeria to gain the understanding of how security awareness and 
employee behaviour impacts on policy compliance. The survey is designed to capture 
how compliance-certified financial institutions implement policies and how employ-
ees respond to situations within the context of information security. The banks select-
ed for this survey have all obtained ISO27000 certifications, in line with the directives 
of CBN. In view of the banks’ reluctance to share vulnerability information, results 
are anonymously obtained for this work. 
The survey was conducted online and it followed a methodology as described in 
[23, 24]. Questions are divided into 3 parts; security culture statements, knowledge 
and awareness statements and demography. Security culture statement assesses the 
behavioural pattern of employees that could undermine effective implementation of 
policies. Knowledge and awareness statement assesse the understanding of security 
policy requirements, while the demography question captures survey representatives 
for segmentation analysis. The recruitment strategy for this work is based on random 
selection from a presumably representative group of bank employee. 
 
 Table 1. Extracts from the online information security survey 
 
The survey questions follow a Likert scale response model (strongly agree, agree, 
uncertain, disagree and strongly disagree), except question 1, which is on survey de-
mography. Survey tool chosen for this work is Google Forms, an online survey appli-
cation that allows real time response, collation and analysis of data. The survey was 
conducted over 2 weeks and respondents were invited to take part in through email 
communication, after obtaining initial clearance from the CISO. Table 1 shows ex-
tracted sample of questions contained in the online survey. 
4 Results and Analysis 
The demography of respondents is shown in figure 1. 15.8% represents the execu-
tive/senior manager level, 12.3% from the IT department, 14% from HR and admin-
istration, 40.4% from Operations and 17.5% represents other categories. Job functions 
of other categories include marketing, accountancy, risk management, sales and pre-
dictive analysis. Our data is analyzed by assigning a range values from 1 to 5 for each 
survey question categorized under the security culture statements and the 
knowledge/awareness statements. Such that, if a statements is true from security 
standpoint, 5 corresponds to 'strongly agree' and 1 corresponds to 'strongly disagree'. 
We then analyzed respondents by demography based on collective points. The maxi-
mum score per respondent is 55 points, which implies good security behaviour and 
compliance, while lower scores down to the minimum of 11 points lean towards poor 
security posture and non-compliance. Results from the security culture statement and 
knowledge/awareness statements is shown in figure 2. 
As a summary, more than 50% of respondents view security measures as inconven-
ient add-on but necessary in getting some jobs done. Organisations need to ensure that 
security steps are viewed and implemented as part of job requirements. It is interest-
ing to see that 12.1% strongly disagree and 9.1% disagree that their organisations has 
information security policy and they know where to locate a copy. Users who are not 
aware of organisation information security policy or know where to locate a copy 
pose a significant risk. It could be that such users simply forget that security policy 
exists or find policy statements hard to understand. When asked if respondents know 
how to report actual (or suspicious) security incidents, 22.6% of respondents have no 
idea on how to do that. When users cannot identify a potential security threat or who 
to contact when there is a breach/compromise, such users may continue to expose 
information assets to threat by making further use of compromised devices. A signifi-
cant number or respondents constituting 28% are misinformed on how to dispose of 
sensitive electronic information. They assumed that data is permanently lost when 
deleted or when hard drives are formatted, this can pose a significant risk to an organ-
isation. Forensic solutions that can erase end-of-life classified data need to be inte-
grated in asset disposal policy. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Demography of respondents 
 
Fig. 2. Information security compliance results 
 
The survey findings indicate that there is a high sense of security awareness but se-
cure practice and behaviour is low, which can have a significant impact on compli-
ance. Although, not surprising, there seem to be higher evidence of compliance by 
employees in the IT department more than any other respondents. Considering that 
this survey is administered on employees from compliant certified financial institu-
tions, it supports our understanding that security by mere compliance is a wishful 
approach to information security issues in Nigerian banking institutions. 
5 Information Security Cultural Framework 
Organizational culture has been described as the shared values, behaviour, attitude 
and practices that sustain connections among people, processes and policies. It is 
suggested that the management and governance of security is most effective when it is 
integrated into the culture of organisational behaviour and actions [25]. Habitual be-
haviour propagates, and it often require concerted efforts to break the norm. If organi-
sations want to project the habit of secure behaviour, perhaps a long term goal that is 
in line with the direction of an organizational security culture is a better approach [4], 
rather than focusing on quick certification status, then assuming that all technical and 
human processes are secured. Organizational security culture is defined as the as-
sumptions, attitudes and perceptions that are accepted and encouraged with the aim of 
protecting information assets, so that attributes and custom of information security 
begins to emerge as the way things are done in an organisation [26]. Thus a strong 
information security culture is vital for managing organisational information assets. A 
number of studies recognized the need for creating security culture [17, 27, 28 and 
29] where employees have the attitude, skill and knowledge to support information 
security objectives. However, steps on how to embed security into the culture of an 
organisations are not addressed [30]. 
 
Fig. 3. Information Security Governance Framework (adopted from [31]) 
We will use a model of information security governance framework adopted from 
[31], in an attempt to show how information security culture can influence a change in 
organisation security postures. Although, the adopted framework did not specifically 
elaborate on how security practices can be embedded in organisation culture, but it 
provided a single point of reference and comprehensive structure upon which organi-
sations can cultivate an acceptable level of information security culture. The frame 
work shown in figure 3 provided a starting point for the governance of information 
security. It explains how guidelines and control implementations can identify and 
address the technical, procedural and human components of information risks. 
The information security governance framework is derived from the integration of 
four different information security frameworks; ISO/IEC27001, PROTECT, Capabil-
ity Maturity Model and Information Security Architecture (ISA) [31]. Key categories 
of the framework that is most relevant to this work are discussed below: 
1. Leadership and governance.  
This category comprises of executive level sponsor of policies and strategies for ad-
dressing the threats of information security. This category also covers the compilation 
and measurement of control effectiveness, in ensuring that organisation long term 
security goals are met. 
2. Security management and organisations.  
This category addresses organisations legal and regulatory requirements for infor-
mation security, for instance, it is now a regulatory requirement for all Nigerian banks 
to be ISO27001 certified. Also, the National Information Technology Development 
Agency (NITDA) guidelines on data protection draft (2013), requires that all federal 
agencies and private organisations that owns, use or deploy information systems with-
in Nigeria is covered by the guidelines [32]. Organisation information security design, 
composition and reporting structure is also addressed in this category. 
3. Security policies.  
Security policies must be implemented through effective process and compliance 
while taking into account other components like legal and ethical considerations. 
Security policies are the overall organisation intention and direction as expressed by 
the management [33]. Policies provide specific guideline for employee behaviour and 
procedures when interacting with information systems. Example may include point-
specific policy statement covering internet acceptable use. 
4. Security program management.  
This category involves auditing and compliance monitoring of both technical and 
human elements of security programs. It must be ensured that policies, processes, 
procedures and controls are managed through continuous monitory, for timely re-
sponse to security breaches. Employee behaviour monitoring could include internet 
usage and technology monitoring could be network traffic monitoring. 
5. User security management.  
User security awareness, ethical conduct and trust are all addressed in this category. 
Ethical conduct is a vital component of security culture, it must be developed and 
communicated as part of a corporate code of conduct. For instance, organisation eth-
ics may include unauthorized data alteration or disclosure. Security awareness pro-
gram needs to be promoted and maintained throughout the organisation and the man-
agement need to find ways to integrate the element of mutual trust between all stake-
holders.  
6. Technology protection and management.  
This involves physical and technical protection measures around information assets. 
As part of the implementation of the security governance framework, it must be en-
sured that appropriate technology controls are included in asset management, tech-
nical operations, physical environments and business continuity. Continuous monitor-
ing of technical controls is also important in order to keep pace with rapid technology 
changes. 
6 Embedding Security in Organisational Culture 
An organisation’s compliance status does not necessarily present desired changed 
behaviour of employees. However, given objective situations, it is unlikely that em-
ployees would be tempted to break the law, if compliance is ingrained into organisa-
tion cultural and daily routine [34]. Embedding security into organisation culture must 
adopt a top-bottom approach, starting with management buy-in and then gradually 
including everyone in the organisation. It has been shown that top management buy-in 
and support has enormous impact on policy enforcement and organisational culture 
[35]. Management top hierarchy are responsible for imposing measures which can 
have great influence on employee attitude, behaviour and motivation; hence, there has 
to be a demonstration of commitment by the management before there can be any 
success of integrating security in organisation culture.  
Using data security as an example, some organisations understand the need for data 
protection but may not know how to prioritize that for all employees. Since most or-
ganisations are covered by national or international data protection acts; this should 
be the starting point for embedding data security into organisation culture. Manage-
ment top hierarchy should be able to understand and communicate their organiza-
tions’ legal/regulatory obligations under data protection laws. Data protection should 
then be included in organisation information security policy, which may further in-
clude policy subsets like regular data backups and unauthorized use of portable devic-
es on corporate computers. Policy subsets should show clear guidelines and best prac-
tices for ensuring data confidentiality, integrity and availability at all times. Through 
user awareness and ethical code of conduct programs, employees should become 
sensitized about organization’s position on data protection. It should be communicat-
ed why data is vital for business continuity, how data loss may impact on business 
and what measures can be taken to ensure data security. Most importantly, data secu-
rity should become the responsibility of all employees and not only dedicated to a 
small unit of staff.  
Technical solutions that complement a data protection policy can then be intro-
duced as part of security plan. Although, employees often see security steps as incon-
venient add-ons that impact on productivity; technical solutions can be introduced 
gradually, while focusing initially on components that constitute everyday security 
issues. Policy subset that safeguards data loss may require that employees must regu-
larly backup data, but compliance can be enforced if data backup becomes part of job 
functions. Technical solutions that can be leveraged as part of data security strategy 
may simply be a system, which forces or reminds employee to do a data backup every 
day. Perhaps, if all employees that interact with information systems cannot logoff 
after a day’s work without completing backups to the central server, this function will 
become embedded in the organisation security culture where data backups become 
part of job requirement, rather than inconvenient security measure. Other policy sub-
sets can then be applied to support compliance, for instance, disabling the USB ports 
on all organisation computers to control unauthorized copying of confidential infor-
mation. Also, implementing a system that compel users to change passwords at inter-
vals may ensure compliance and reduce threats posed by employees that are suscepti-
ble to social engineering.  
Through these measures, employees will become involved in the process of securi-
ty whereby security requirements are incorporated within operational system 
architecture. As employees learn to comply with the requirements of a policy, and 
observed behavioural change starts to emerge to the point where secure behaviour 
becomes second nature, a change in organizational culture which is also security driv-
en will become evident. Thereafter, management can begin to gently introduce other 
policy requirements in stages until the entire policy becomes embedded in the organi-
zational culture. Through continuous assessment, the effectiveness of each security 
component embedded in the organisation culture can be measured over a given period 
of time. Security metrics may be based on how many times an organisation has rec-
orded incidents of data loss since data backup has become part of job requirements. 
Employees will ultimately identify those changes as part of corporate culture and may 
not require extra motivation, reward or punishment to perform those functions. There 
are additional benefits of improved reputation and efficiency for organisations that 
have sound security practices integrated in its culture, ultimately becoming compliant 
and secured. 
7 Conclusion 
We believe that in addition to compliance, organisations need to cultivate information 
security culture because compliance is not the same as security. In addition, there is 
no guarantee that employees will comply with policy requirements. Human factors 
continue to represent the gap between processes and technology, and there is no dif-
ference between malicious intent, negligence or external attacks in terms of diminish-
ing IT functions. There is insufficient understanding of the risks posed by users of 
information assets, therefore, management are mostly focused on achieving compli-
ance status without necessarily understanding that compliance is just a part of infor-
mation security.  
The strongest influence on organisation culture begins with the position of leader-
ship. Leadership acceptance and active participation in holistic cultural change, is a 
key aspect of information security. Executive level security representation and a 
change in management behaviour, will reflect on employees’ behaviour too. Infor-
mation security channel of communication should be clearly defined and all employ-
ees need to be part of security. Often, organisations have dedicated IT units that en-
force the implementation of information security policies, rather than promoting a 
sense of shared responsibility where security is a required function for everyone. 
Once the overall mind-set of an organisation begins to change, a culture where securi-
ty is pivotal will begin to emerge and compliance will inevitable become an integral 
part of organizational culture. If policy compliance becomes natural to employees, it 
will be much easier for new employees to emulate acceptable behaviour through ob-
servation. It is unlikely that information security culture can be covered by a single 
framework or few technical solutions. Future research may consider how to integrate 
other frameworks with the one adopted for this work and also suggest how human-
centric technical solutions can be integrated into organisation security culture. This 
model hasn’t been tested in other security domains, but it has been subjected to cri-
tique from industry experts with good feedback on its feasibility. As part of future 
work, there will be a robust comparative empirical model to test the validity of obser-
vations made through this work. 
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